Standard accounts of legislative behavior typically neglect the activities of professional staff, who are treated as extensions of the elected officials they serve. However, staff appear to have substantial independent effects on observed levels of legislator productivity and policy preferences. In this paper, we use a novel dataset of comprehensive longitudinal employment records from the U.S. House of Representatives to estimate the effects of Congressional staff on legislative behavior. Specifically, results from a series of heteroskedastic Bayesian spatial autoregressive models indicate that members of Congress who exchange important staff members across congresses are more similar in their legislative effectiveness and voting patterns than we would otherwise expect. These findings suggest that scholars should reconsider the role of staff in the legislative process.
INTRODUCTION
Research on legislative behavior typically ignores the role of staff. For instance, scholarship on the U.S. Congress has typically considered legislators as individuals (e.g., Mayhew 1974) or as members of parties (e.g., Aldrich 2011) , not as managers of small organizations (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981b) . Staff are treated as proxies for the legislators whom they serve; agency loss due to delegation and variation in staff effectiveness are thus implicitly assumed to be minimal.
While treating legislators as individuals is a useful simplifying assumption, it ignores the potentially significant effects of staff on legislative behavior. The demands of the legislative process outstrip the time or expertise of even the most capable elected official. As a result, legislators necessarily depend on staff advice when they cast votes on the floor and in committee and rely on aides to help construct, negotiate, and pass legislation on their behalf.
1 This dependence on staff creates the potential for substantial agency loss in voting (e.g., Malbin 1980; Kingdon 1989 ) and staff-induced variation in members' legislative effectiveness (e.g., DeGregorio 1995; Whiteman 1995; Leal and Hess 2004) .
However, the effects of staff on legislative behavior have received scant scholarly attention, especially in quantitative research. Revisiting the role of staff in the legislative process in the contemporary period is especially important given changes in the operation of Congress in recent decades, which have created conditions that might increase staff influence. First, staff are increasingly loyal to parties rather than members (Jensen 2011; Karol 2014) , increasing the potential for agency loss but also facilitating staff-led coordination within parties. In addition, increased fundraising demands have reduced the time legislators can spend on legislative activities (e.g., Grim and Siddiqui 2013) , which may increase reliance on staff.
1 Similar arguments have recently been made about the influence of staff in American state legislatures and how it may have grown in states that have instituted term limits on legislative service -see, e.g., Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000) , Cain and Kousser (2004) , and Carey et al. (2006) . In comparative politics, Ringe, Victor, and Gross (2013) recently used staff ties to proxy for social connections between legislators in the European Parliament.
In this article, we provide the first rigorous test of the effects of staff on legislative behavior using newly available administrative records on staff employement in the contemporary era. Our empirical strategy focuses on informal staff networks within parties, which play an important role in linking legislators together and shaping their behavior. Using uniquely detailed employment data from the House of Representatives, we identify members who exchanged one or more senior or policy staffers and estimate the similarities in their behavior using spatial autoregressive models. Our results indicate that representatives who exchanged top staffers are more similar in their legislative effectiveness (Volden and Wiseman 2014) and voting patterns (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004) than we would otherwise expect conditional on numerous explanatory variables.
These results suggest that staff play a key role in transmitting expertise and developing policy positions among legislators and thus in the operations and effectiveness of Congress.
THE ROLE OF STAFF IN THE U.S. CONGRESS
Members of the contemporary U.S. Congress face overwhelming burdens. A typical congressional office must handle numerous tasks on a near-daily basis including responding to constituent requests and inquiries; participating in and tracking legislative debates; writing, amending, and voting on legislation; handling press inquiries; and preparing to run for re-election. These tasks are critical to the success of the member and to the functioning of the legislative branch itself.
However, they are also time-consuming and demand significant levels of technical knowledge and task-specific expertise that very few individuals can develop on their own. How can members meet all of these demands for their time and attention simultaneously?
In reality, members themselves can not and do not perform all of these tasks, but instead rely heavily on their staffs. As Hall notes, "Faced with the press of excessive obligations and the frequent prospect of needing to be two places at once, members have responded by relying increasingly on staff. . . and much of what members do in person is prefigured by the options and information that staffers supply" (1996, 28) . The role of legislators has thus changed to include managing -or being managed by -a large team of professionals. As Salisbury and Shepsle (1981b, 559) put it, "each member of Congress has come to operate as the head of an enterprise -an organization consisting of anywhere from eight or ten to well over one hundred subordinates."
This heavy reliance on staff is a relatively recent development (Hammond 1984 (Hammond , 1996 . As late as the 1940s, staff resources were scarce. The number of professional staff in Congress and the importance of their duties then grew rapidly. Between the end of World War II and the 1970s, for instance, personal staffs increased fivefold (Malbin 1980) . Staff growth continued through the 1980s until being scaled back in the 1990s (Hall 1996) . However, the decline was concentrated among committee staff (Ornstein et al. 2013) ; personal staff sizes have remained relatively stable.
Staff influence
Of course, the mere presence of staff does not itself imply that they are influential. After all, Capitol Hill staffers are hired, fired, supervised, promoted, and paid by members. Likewise, staffers' future employment prospects are closely aligned with the political success of their employers (Salisbury and Shepsle 1981a; Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014) . For this reason, delegation to staff may result in limited agency loss. Staff also often hold similar views to their member and might thus function more as an "extension" of the legislator rather than an independent influence (Kingdon 1989, 207-208) . Kingdon, for instance, initially argued that staff have little influence on members' voting decisions except among junior members or those in competitive districts (1973) . Though he observed a striking correlation between legislators' votes and staff positions when staff are involved in voting decisions, he attributed this association largely to selfselection in job-seeking and hiring. Similarly, DeGregorio (1995) , argues that members primarily delegate important tasks to long-term, "loyal" staffers who can be trusted to pursue member goals rather than staffers' own preferences.
Nonetheless, researchers and observers have long suggested that Hill staff are not mere ciphers who execute their members' will while exerting no influence of their own (e.g., Price 1971) . Given the complexity and scope of activities undertaken by members' offices, it would be impossible for legislators to monitor all the activities of their staff closely or to operate effectively without the assistance of staff. Press accounts and past research make clear that staffers are given significant responsibilities and enjoy substantial autonomy (see the Online Appendix for descriptions of the broad responsibilities they hold). That is, while staffers are responsive to members, they also exert considerable independent influence (e.g., Fox and Hammond 1977; Malbin 1980; DeGregorio 1988; Hall 1996) . For instance, in her examination of policy leaders in Congress, DeGregorio concludes that "staffers comprise a goodly share of the leadership elite" (1995, 507) . Similarly, Salisbury and Shepsle (1981b, 559) state that the organizations legislators now lead "constrain and shape the behavior of the members in ways that help make the Congress itself a 'loosely coupled' collection of these enterprises." Even critics of staff delegation acknowledge that "Congress could not function in today's world without the staff on which it has come to depend" (Malbin 1980, 4) .
In what ways do staff exert influence? Though existing research has suggested many possible ways in which staff could affect the legislative process, we focus below on two areas identified in previous research: providing legislative expertise and championing specific policy goals.
First, staff help members navigate the often complex process of moving legislation through Congress, providing "a thread of continuity, institutional memory, and expertise within the institution" (Romzek and Utter 1997, 1252 Scholars report similar conclusions. Whiteman (1995) uses detailed interviews to argue that staff play a crucial role in gathering information and building support for legislation, while Leal and Hess (2004) suggest that hiring inexperienced staff may hamper the effectiveness of legislators from racial or ethnic minority groups.
2 As discussed below, we focus in this study on personal legislative staff. We specifically consider the effects of senior staff, whom we define as individuals holding titles that are variants of chief of staff, legislative/executive/staff director, or administrative assistant, and policy staff, whom we define as individuals with titles that are variants of legislative assistant, attorney/counsel, or specialists in listed issues (non-correspondence). See the Online Appendix for further details.
Other scholars have argued that staff are not only sources of Capitol Hill experience, but help determine the content of legislation and influence members' voting decisions. In this way, member delegation to staff may produce significant agency loss. For instance, Kingdon reevaluated his view on this point in a later edition of his book, conceding "the real possibility that staff influence on legislative voting decisions is greater now than this chapter's portrayal would suggest" as well as the potential for staff influence on the member's legislative advocacy efforts (1989, (206) (207) .
This view is consistent with Price (1971) , which argues that staff do not just act as neutral experts but instead play an entrepreneurial role in influencing policy. Similarly, Malbin (1980) contends that staffers exert independent influence in the policymaking process, labeling high-powered Hill staffers "unelected representatives" who can distort the democratic system. Others have argued that staff can influence policy by both championing specific policies and legislation (Degregorio 1996) and by building networks of support in pursuit of legislative aims (Whiteman 1995) . Most recently, Wilson (2013) suggests that staff characteristics may affect legislators' issue priorities.
The changing nature of staff in a partisan era
Changes in working conditions on Capitol Hill make questions about staff influence especially important to consider. First, working conditions have become increasingly unattractive for staff, making staff positions less appealing to those who lack strong partisan views. While Salisbury and Shepsle (1981a, 383) could write that, "The pay is good and. . . it is often far higher than alternative employment would bring," the period in which staff were well-paid is over. Even in 1995, the Congressional Management Foundation noted that "Staff typically work exceedingly long, unpredictable hours that leave little time for outside activities; receive lower pay than both private sector and federal executive branch staff. . . and have virtually no job security" (1995, 1) . Salaries have continued to decline since then in real terms (Petersen, Chausow, and Wilhelm 2014) . Further, increasing polarization in Washington has permeated every aspect of the legislative process, which is likely to make a career as a staffer unattractive to non-partisans (Karol 2014) .
As a result of these changes, staff are likely to be less loyal to individual members and more motivated by partisanship or ideology, which increases the potential for agency loss. Commit-ment to the party is a more important predictor of whether staff leave Capitol Hill than personal commitment to individual members (Jensen 2011) . 3 The incentives for staff to demonstrate party loyalty are likely especially high given the possibility of staff working for aligned groups such as interest groups and political campaigns or joining lobbying firms, which offer lucrative salaries in a sector that is increasingly organized along partisan lines (Confessore 2003; Cain and Drutman 2014) . Given the increasing role of partisanship in the legislative process, incentives have also likely changed on the hiring side, where members looking for new staff are likely to consider not just expertise but loyalty to the party and its policies. Those staffers who have valuable connections within the party are likely to be attractive to members who want to move into leadership, run for higher office, or advance legislation with the support of partisan allies (e.g., Wolffe 2009).
Second, the time allocation of members of Congress has seemingly shifted. Legislators are not only expected to spend extensive time in their districts but must devote half or more of their time to fundraising, which leaves little time for legislative efforts (Alexander 2005; Grim and Siddiqui 2013) . Their reliance on staff is thus likely to be significant, creating the potential for significant agency loss in position-taking as well as greater staff-induced variation in legislative productivity.
Hypotheses
While many of the works cited above examine the influence of staff on member actions, previous studies have not used quantitative methods to rigorously test whether staff affect the legislative effectiveness and voting patterns of members of Congress. Our empirical strategy leverages movement between offices by senior and policy staff, which create a key informal network within
Congress that helps to shape the actions of legislators. Previous studies have not considered how staffers link legislators together, but this approach is consistent with a growing body of research on non-hierarchical linkages between members of contemporary parties and their allies (see, e.g., Bernstein and Dominguez 2003 , Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009 , Herrnson 2009 , Koger, Masket, and Noel 2010 , Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2014 , and Nyhan and Montgomery 2015 . It also provides a novel approach to estimating staff effects on member behavior that are otherwise difficult to isolate. 4 We expect that staff ties produce increased similarity in legislator behavior via two mechanisms. First, when staff members move between legislators, the specific knowledge, relationships (including with party leaders), and expertise that influenced their previous employer will in turn influence the behavior of their new employer, producing greater similarity in the behavior of the two legislators than we would otherwise expect. (Deering and Wahlbeck 2006; Cann 2008 ). Pombo's former legislative director and deputy chief of staff was serving as legislative director for another member, George Nethercutt (R-WA), who touted his connections to Pombo, 4 As we note below, most of the staff we consider only work for a single member.
5 This argument assumes staff leave lasting effects on their prior employers, which is consistent with, e.g., patterns of relatively consistent position-taking over time (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) .
Those prior employers may of course also be influenced by replacement staff. If so, however, it should be more difficult for us to find a significant relationship (we thank a reviewer for this point).
stating that the House Resources chair "understands my feelings" and "will work with me to get a bill" to protect an area known as Wild Sky northeast of Seattle (Daly 2004) . The staff tie between Pombo and Nethercutt was likely a key mechanism of this relationship.
These mechanisms of influence and coordination are likely to influence two major outcomes of interest. First, senior and policy staff are likely to influence the effectiveness of their new office (either positively or negatively) by altering the ways that their new members' offices approach the legislative process and fostering working relationships between their former and current employers.
In this way, staff play a crucial role in disseminating specific practices and approaches to moving legislation through the chamber and influencing the lawmaking process.
Second, staff not only influence how effective members are in pursuing their legislative goals but the content of the positions that members take and the goals they pursue. Legislators face difficult information constraints that require them to take positions on hundreds or thousands of proposals. Many of these proposals are obscure and/or technical, which may increase legislators' reliance on staff and other sources in determining which vote to cast or position to take. In addition, other proposals require complex calculations about the substantive costs and benefits of a proposal as well as the potential political consequences of supporting or opposing it. In either case, staff provide advice to members that is likely to reflect what they told their previous boss. In some cases, staffers may even consult or coordinate with their former colleagues or prior employer directly about a bill or upcoming vote. These influences could make legislators who have employed the same staffer likely to vote more similarly than we might otherwise expect. We formalize these expectations as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Member offices that are linked by high-level staff will be more similar in terms of legislative effectiveness than we would otherwise expect.
Hypothesis 2: Member offices that are linked by high-level staff will vote in a more similar manner than we would otherwise expect.
However, past research provides little guidance about the exact level of seniority or status required for a staffer's influence on a member to be measurable. Should we expect to detect effects only when examining senior staff (e.g., chiefs of staff and legislative directors) alone or should we also consider the influence of policy staff (e.g., legislative assistants and policy advisers assigned to specific areas)? 6 Lacking clear theoretical guidance, we test our hypotheses for the networks formed by senior staff ties as well as the networks formed from both policy and senior staff ties. Such a decision also requires us to make a tradeoff between the strength of the staff-based connections between members we measure and the number of connections that we can use to test our hypotheses. If we define a staff tie narrowly, the ties we isolate will be stronger but fewer will be observed, whereas a broader definition will encompass more ties at the cost of capturing ties that are weaker on average. It is unclear a priori which approach is preferable.
As we discuss below, our empirical results suggest that only senior staff ties have a significant influence on members' legislative effectiveness. By contrast, the effects of staff on voting patterns are measurable when we include both senior and policy staff but not senior staff alone. These results can be understood theoretically in light of the differing responsibilities of senior and policy staff members. Senior staff play a broader role in organizing member offices and exercise greater responsibility in key tasks such as negotiating with other members' offices and coordinating with party leadership. It is thus plausible that they would have a particularly strong influence on members' ability to move their policy priorities through the legislative arena. These tasks often fall outside the purview of policy staffers; including them in the staff ties network may serve simply to dilute the effect of senior staff. By contrast, policy staff are likely to be important in shaping members' broader record of roll call votes on the hundreds of matters that come before the chamber. These matters are the primary focus of activity for policy staff and may receive less attention from senior staff in isolation. As a result, it may be necessary to consider the ties formed by policy staffers in order to find a measurable effect. 6 Our focus is restricted to the senior and policy staffers who previous research and press accounts identify as key players on Capitol Hill. We do not expect administrative or constituent service staff to influence the effectiveness or voting of legislators.
Finally, as in any observational study, it is important to take steps to rule out alternative explanations. We therefore control below for a number of relevant covariates including seniority, committee membership, and majority party status in models of legislative effectiveness as well as party and district presidential votes in models of voting patterns. All models also control for the race, ethnicity, and gender of members. Finally, we take additional steps to account for the possibility that staff may tend to choose to work for members with similar policy views or with similar levels of legislative effectiveness. To address this possibility, we conduct falsification tests to assess the extent to which our results appear to reflect self-selection by similar staff and legislators (i.e., homophily) rather than staff influence on legislator behavior. 7 Additional details about these covariates are provided in the Online Appendix. 8 The size of the staff population is largely stable over time during the period covered by our data (12,427-13,099 per Congress). We exclude committee staff because our data typically do not distinguish majority from minority staff and it is also impossible to link staffers to specific members in most cases (see Online Appendix for details).
We then coded position titles in the CQ data using pattern and string matching procedures to identify the senior and policy staff will be most likely to affect Congressional voting patterns and legislative effectiveness. 9 We then merged the data on senior and policy staff to House member data from Volden and Wiseman (2014) and Bayesian ideal point estimates (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004) generated using roll-call records provided by Poole and Rosenthal (2007) . 10 Among the 3,973 member-Congress observations in our data during this period, staff data were missing for only 112 cases (2.8%; see Online Appendix for further details).
From these data, we constructed adjacency matrices for each Congress representing the number of staff ties between members for the 105 th to the 111 th Congresses, which allows us to test if members who share ties in the network are more similar than we would otherwise expect relative to those who are not connected directly by staff ties. If we have n members in a given Congress, the edge weight W i,j between members i and j in the n × n adjacency matrix W is simply the total number of senior and policy staff who worked for both members during the current Congress or one of the previous two congresses. 11 For statistical reasons, these ties are thus undirected 12 -we assume that two offices that have exchanged staffers will be more similar. This approach reflects our expectation that staff have lasting effects on the voting patterns and legislative effectiveness of members. For instance, if a staffer works for member i in Congress t − 1 and then leaves to work for member j in Congress t, we expect that the influence of the staffer will make j behave more like i in Congress t by bringing her expertise and priorities (which have left a mark on i that persists at time t) to the office of j. In addition, the staffer working for j may continue to communicate and coordinate with i's staff during Congress t, further aligning their activities and priorities.
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As discussed above, theory does not provide clear guidance about the exact level of seniority or position required for a staffer's influence on a member to be measurable. We therefore construct two adjacency matrices W for each Congress:
• Senior staff only: Ties exist among members who employed the same senior staff member(s).
• Policy and senior staff: Ties exist if members employed the same individual(s) as a senior or policy staff member.
In the empirical analyses below, we report results from both approaches.
To address potential threats to inference, we also construct "placebo" adjacency matrices W for each Congress that we use in falsification tests in the results section (described further below).
The results from these matrices allow us to estimate whether our results appear to be driven by self-selection by members and staff. First, we identify all staff who are least likely to influence the legislative effectiveness or voting record of each member. Specifically, we focus on staff who not senior staff, policy staff, or constituency staff. 14 If adjacency matrices constructed these placebo staff ties show high levels of spatial autocorrelation, it would suggest that the relationships we observe are driven by self-selection (lower-level staff are also likely to display homophily with members but are unlikely to directly influence legislative effectiveness or voting patterns). Second, 13 This approach differs from research on direct inter-member relationships in legislatures (e.g., Kingdon 1989; Fowler 2006a; Masket 2008; Rogowski and Sinclair 2012) . The closest analogue is the Ringe, Victor, and Gross (2013) study of staff ties in the European Parliament.
14 We thank a reviewer for pointing out that constituency staff may shape the flow of information from the district to members, which implies they should be excluded from our placebo test.
we construct otherwise identical matrices to those above reflecting future senior or senior/policy staff ties -the matrices include ties in a Congress that will be formed in one of the next two congresses but not those that exist in the current Congress or the previous two (as in the standard measures). Again, significant levels of spatial autocorrelation in legislative effectiveness for future ties would indicate self-selection by staffers and legislators rather than a causal effect. 
Descriptive statistics and example network
To estimate staff effects, we need to observe them working for more than one member. Our analyses below therefore necessarily leverage switches between offices among staff who work for more than one member. We first note that these sorts of position switches are relatively uncommon. Despite high levels of personnel turnover in House offices (e.g., Drutman 2012), most staff members who leave a position on a legislator's personal staff exit the chamber rather than taking another job in the House. During the period covered by our data, only 12% of the staff who served at the senior or policy leadership level held an equivalent position for two or more House members.
However, transitions between House offices are more frequently observed among long-term staff -for instance, 44% of those who served in five or more Congresses in our data worked for more than one member.
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In addition, it is worth noting that House staffing patterns display a remarkable degree of stability over this period, increasing our confidence in our ability to generalize across congresses in the data. Figure 1a shows that members average approximately 16-19 unique staff members per Congress (including Washington, D.C. and district staff) and 5.5-7 staff at the senior or policy 15 It is not possible to use the future staff ties approach as a falsification test for ideology because scores on the measure are so highly autocorrelated. Ideology is correlated with lagged ideology at r = 0.933. Correlation across congresses for legislative effectiveness is a much more modest (Petersen, Reynolds, and Wilhelm 2010) . In all, we found no evidence of any systematic changes in staffing patterns in this period. Due to the relatively infrequent withinchamber office switching among senior staff noted above, we observe only a modest number of ties between members created by staff change as displayed in Figure 1b . However, the frequency of these staff ties between House members is quite stable (the expected number of connections for a randomly chosen legislator ranges from 0.37 to 0.51 during our sample period). vide an illustrative example in Figure 2 , which shows the network of non-isolate House members linked by senior or policy staff in the 107 th Congress. As expected, connected legislators are overwhelmingly segregated by party. In fact, the parties are disjoint; we observe no links between Democratic and Republican legislators via shared senior or policy staff. Also, though the networks are not fully connected, we see large connected components of both Republicans (white nodes) and Democrats (black nodes) as well as isolated dyads and smaller components in each party.
Spatial autoregression
Our hypothesis is that legislators who are linked by shared senior or policy staff will have more similar legislative effectiveness scores (Volden and Wiseman 2014) 
where n is the number of observations, X is an n × p covariate matrix, and W is an n × n weight matrix with zeros along the diagonal. V is a diagonal matrix containing variance scalar parameters, which allow for individual observations to be divergent from the behavior of their neighbors (LeSage and Pace 2009). In essence, adding these scalar terms to the error distribution is equivalent to assuming a Student-t prior distribution for the errors.
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The model is fully specified by placing priors over the model parameters, ρ, β, σ and V . We specify standard uninformative reference priors on the regression coefficients (β) and variance term (σ). Further, we place a uniform prior on the spatial autocorrelation coefficient, ρ ∼ U (−1, 1). Finally, the prior distribution for the variance scalar parameters is
In this case, we use the default hyperprior recommendation from LeSage and Pace (2009) and set 20 We do not, for instance, use exponential random graph models (ERGMs) because the goal of those models is to understand how and why networks are formed. Though that is a valuable topic for future research, our goal here is to estimate the effect of staff ties on legislative behavior. 21 All analyses were conducted in Matlab using sar g (LeSage and Pace 2009). 22 Our spatial regression approach is preferable to a mixed-effects model (e.g., Ringe, Victor, and Gross 2013) for this application because we wish to model spatial autocorrelation directly rather than treating it as a nuisance parameter. Moreover, our approach provides a single, directly interpretable estimate of the level of autocorrelation among connected members in the spatial lag term (ρ). r = 4, which allows for a modest degree of heteroskedasticity in the data generating process.
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Within this context, the spatial adjacency matrix W we study represents the strength of the ties between members i and j in a unipartite network, which we measure as a simple count of the number of staff currently employed in member i's office that were previously employed in member j's office in the current congress or previous two congresses and vice versa. 24 The values for W i,j are thus the number of staff who worked for both i and j in the congress in question 25 and the two previous ones after being row-standardized, which normalizes the matrix so that each row sums to exactly one for members that have one or more shared staff members and to zero otherwise (a standard procedure in this literature; see, e.g., Ward and Gleditsch 2008; LeSage and Pace 2009). 26 In our statistical model, the key parameter is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient ρ. This term measures the tendency of members who are linked by staff to behave more more similarly than we would expect by chance alone after controlling for other relevant factors such as party, district preferences, seniority, and gender. Our theory implies that ρ > 0, which means that members who share staff will be more similar than otherwise expected. We emphasize that the ρ parameter 23 The v i terms are included to handle heteroskedasticity resulting from large outliers and areas of non-constant variances within the adjacency matrix. Additional options would be to allow for spatial effects in the error term or to specify a spatial Durbin model. However, both Bayesian and ML estimation of these more complex models converged poorly and exhibited pathological instability in parameter estimation (details available upon request). 24 We show in the Online Appendix that our results are robust to instead considering only staff ties in the current congress or the previous one.
25 It is not possible to account for indirect ties using weights based on network distance because the networks formed by staff ties are not fully connected and many distances are thus infinite. does not imply a directional relationship. For instance, the positive spatial coefficients we report below do not mean that members who exchange staffers have higher legislative effectiveness a more conservative ideology than other members. Instead, positive ρ values indicate that members linked by staffers are more similar in their behavior than we would otherwise expect conditional on the covariates in our models. Thus, ρ should be understood as the predicted change in the outcome variable for a given member as the scores for all of her "neighbors" in the network increase by one unit (Ward and Gleditsch 2008, 38) .
In the analyses below, we report posterior means and standard deviations for ρ separately for the 105 th to the 112 th Congress. We also report pooled estimates for these posteriors across all congresses using the procedure outlined by Gelman et al. (2004) . We take this cross-sectional approach out of necessity. Despite advances in analyzing spatial autocorrelation in panel data, all methods of which we are aware assume that the spatial weights matrix W is constant across time periods. In our case, however, we calculate a new weights matrix for each Congress to allow for changes in staff ties over time. We therefore estimate a series of separate cross-sectional models and pool our estimates, which offers a useful way to combine our inferences across congresses while still allowing the network of member-staff relationships to evolve over time.
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While the spatial autocorrelation coefficient ρ is the parameter of primary interest in our analysis, we also report the other key structural parameters below that are denoted β in Equation (1).
However, some caution is needed in interpreting these coefficients. In a standard linear regression model in which y = Xβ + , the expected change in y resulting from a one unit change in some covariate r, denoted X r , is captured by the regression parameter β r . (Under the strict linearity assumption in OLS, the partial derivative ∂y ∂Xr is just β r .) By contrast, the predicted value of y i in the spatial autoregressive model specified in Equation (1) 2009, 38) . In other words, the level of effectiveness we expect to observe for member i is related to the level of effectiveness we expect to observe for all units adjacent to member i in the adjacency matrix described above. To see this, we can re-write Equation (1) above as:
In this model, the change in the vector y associated with a one unit change in covariate r (which we denote as S r (W)) is:
To facilitate interpretation in our analysis below, we therefore follow LeSage and Pace (2009) in reporting the average direct effect for covariates we discuss. The average direct effect is the change in y i associated with a one unit change in covariate r for that same unit i. This quantity can be calculated as E(D) = n −1 tr(S r (W)). The total average effect, or the average effect of a one unit change on covariate r on the entire system, can be calculated as E(T ) = n −1 1 n (S r (W))1 n .
Finally, we also report the average indirect effect, a quantity that represents the average effect of changes in covariate values across units and can be calculated as E(I) = E(T ) − E(D). 
Outcome variables
To test the influence of staff on legislators' contribution to the legislative process (Hypothesis 1), we use legislative effectiveness scores (LES), which were created by Volden and Wiseman (2014) to capture members' ability to propose new bills and move them through the legislative process. This composite measure includes information about the number of significant and substantive bills members sponsor, whether those bills receive action at the committee stage or beyond, and 28 While it is possible in principle to estimate this model using maximum likelihood, we use a Bayesian approach and calculate effects directly using draws from the full posterior distribution.
whether the bills passed the House or became law. 29 In general, these scores capture the "proven ability to advance a member's agenda through the legislative process and into law" (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 18 ; see also http://www.thelawmakers.org/#/method).
We also wish to test the extent to which staff ties are associated with the positions members take, including how they vote in roll calls on the floor. Hypothesis 2 is therefore tested using onedimensional Bayesian ideal-point estimates (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004) , which can be broadly interpreted as measuring the ideology of members. 
RESULTS
Having described our data and statistical approach, we next turn to presenting our main results.
We begin by focusing on the role of staff in influencing legislative effectiveness and then assess their role in the policy positions that legislators take.
Legislative effectiveness
Our first hypothesis is that member offices who are linked via staff members will be more similar in their legislative effectiveness than we would otherwise anticipate. Following Volden and
Wiseman (2014), we predict members' legislative effectiveness scores (LES) using models that also control for the number of years members have served consecutively in the House, majority party status, gender, race, whether they are a committee and/or subcommittee chair, and whether 29 In the 105 th -111 th Congresses, LES scores ranged from 0 to 18.6. The mean value is 0.996 with a standard deviation of 1.526. 30 Though several alternative measures exist, they are all highly correlated. In particular, all of our main results in Tables 3 and 4 they are in the majority or minority leadership. 31 Note that the majority party indicator implicitly controls for party affiliation because we estimate a separate model for each Congress as described above.
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As noted above, our main interest is in the spatial autoregressive term ρ, which indicates the degree to which legislators who are connected by staffers are more similar in their level of legislative effectiveness than we would expect by chance alone. We begin by considering the network of ties created by the movement of senior staff members between offices (e.g., chief of staff, legislative director, etc.). These results are shown in Table 1 . 33 The spatial autoregressive coefficient ρ is positive in each congress except for two, indicating that members who are linked via senior staff ties are more similar in their legislative effectiveness conditional on the covariates in the model than we would otherwise expect. Further, while not all of the spatial autoregressive coefficients are reliably greater than zero, the pooled estimate of ρ is 0.043 with a 95% credible interval of [0.085, 0.096], indicating that network effects are reliably greater than zero overall. Senior staff appear to influence the legislative effectiveness of the offices in which they work.
To make the substantive implications of these results clearer, it is helpful to present the estimated effect of partisan staff connections in a particular model. If we focus on the 108 th Congress, 31 Because our observations are defined at the legislator-Congress level, we cannot control directly for dyad-level measures of similarity between members such as shared committee assignments or similar racial or ethnic backgrounds. We thus include indicators for black and Latino legislators instead. In the Online Appendix, we further show that our results are robust to the inclusion of committee fixed effects.
32 Controlling for party affiliation is statistically equivalent to controlling for majority party status in the models we estimate for each congress. We thus control for majority status, which is more relevant to our outcome of interest (Volden and Wiseman 2014) . 33 Although there is some congress-level variation in our estimates of ρ in each of our tables, we observe no consistent pattern that can be clearly linked to changes in party control or electoral outcomes. We therefore focus on the pooled results below. the expected direct effect of an increase in legislative effectiveness for committee chairs is 1.853 with a 90% credible interval of [1.403, 2.358] (compared with not serving as chair). However, the chairmanship effect is likely to have spillover benefits to other legislator who are linked via staff ties to the member in question. Allies of that legislator whose offices are led by former staffers of the chair may be more likely to have their bills make it through the committee, for instance.
Alternatively, legislators may benefit from ties to the committee chair via former staffers who now work for him or her. The estimated indirect effect of being a committee chair, which takes into account the effects on other members connected to the chair via the staff network and is calculated by subtracting the direct effect from the total effect, is 0.442 with a 90% credible interval of [0.120, 0.834], which represents a roughly 0.3 standard deviation increase in that Congress. Table 2 shows the results of an identical model when the staff ties we consider among members are expanded to include the policy staffers described above (e.g., legislative aides) in addition to the senior staff considered in the previous analysis. In this case, the results are more ambiguous. Legislative effectiveness does not seem to be reliably transmitted through the broader group of senior and policy staff (pooled estimate of ρ = 0.013 with a 95% credible interval of [−0.014, 0.038], which is consistent with our expectations but not statistically conclusive). The weaker relationship among this broader group of staff may be the result of the disproportionate role senior staff seem to play in moving specific bills through the legislative process. Policy staffers may be more influential, as we find below, in shaping roll-call voting by members.
Voting record
Our second hypothesis is that legislators who are linked by partisan staff ties have more similar voting records than we would otherwise anticipate. As before, we fit a spatial autoregressive model to test whether staff connections between offices covary with the outcome in question conditional on a series of observable covariates. Obviously, however, the covariates used in our analysis of legislative effectiveness are not necessarily appropriate in modeling voting patterns. (For instance, there is no reason to believe that being a committee subchair is by itself related to voting patterns.) Our models of ideology therefore include covariates that are plausibly associated with member voting records including membership in the Democratic party, gender, and race, ethnicity.
Most importantly, we also control for district preferences, which we measure using the two-party vote received by the Democratic presidential candidate in the previous election in each member's congressional district as well as a squared presidential vote share term that allows for potential non-linearities.
We again begin by considering the network of ties created by the movement of senior staff between offices. These results are shown in Table 3 . As with the results in Table 2 , the spatial autoregressive coefficients in these models are mostly positive, but the pattern is not consistent over time. As a result, the pooled estimate is very small (ρ = −0.003) and is not reliably distinguishable from zero (the 95% credible interval for this parameter is [−0.029, 0.020]). We therefore lack sufficient evidence to conclude that senior staff affect members' voting records (as represented by .023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) 
Bayesian ideal points).
When we consider the larger network of policy and senior staff ties, however, the data tell a very different story. These results are provided in American Democrat who have been redistricted into the same district. As we might expect, the direct effect of race is associated with a more liberal ideology. 34 The direct effect of race is 0.172 
Falsification tests
Any analysis like ours that uses observational data must address concerns about endogeneity. In particular, it is possible that our results are simply a consequence of staff seeking out members with 34 We use causal language here for ease of exposition, but acknowledge that the effects of immutable factors such as race are difficult to analyze in causal terms (Sen and Wasow 2016) . 35 As noted above, the direct effect is calculated as E(D) = n −1 tr(S r (W)) where S r (W) is specified in Equation 5 . In a Bayesian framework, the full posterior for this quantity can be calculated by re-calculating E(D) for each draw out of the posterior. similar characteristics to their previous bosses or members hiring staff from legislators with similar records. We therefore performed a series of falsification tests using placebo adjacency matrices of lower-level staff and future senior or senior/policy staff ties between legislators (described in section 3.1 above). If our results are spurious in this way, then we should observe significant spatial autocorrelation for both lower-level and future senior/policy staff ties.
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The falsification tests we conducted using these two strategies are summarized in Table 5 .
The first two rows in the table report falsification tests for legislative effectiveness scores using adjacency matrices constructed from lower-level and future senior staff ties. 37 The third row reports falsification tests for the ideology scores using adjacency matrices constructed form lower-level staff ties.
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The results provide little evidence that our results for legislative effectiveness are the result of homophily between staff and legislators. The pooled estimates are not reliably different from zero for either set of placebo ties. In the case of legislative effectiveness, the 95% [−0.012, 0.066]). However, the credible interval for the placebo test overlaps the previous point estimate, which suggests that homophily in voting patterns may be a factor in staff movement between offices. Some caution is therefore required about interpreting the results in Table 4 as entirely causal. The relationship between staff ties and similarities in voting records is likely to 36 The goal of this approach is to evaluate whether a modeling approach correctly recovers an effect that is expected to be zero based on theory (Sekhon 2009 ). Falsification tests thus differ from network permutation tests, which evaluate the probability of an outcome under a null distribution constructed by randomizing the set of ties among actors. 37 We focus on senior staff ties given the significant relationship we find above. 38 As noted above, future staff ties are not an appropriate falsification test for measures of ideology since they tend to be so stable across time periods (see Footnote 15). Tables 1-4 ; full results available upon request). House staff data from CQ First Street for the 105 th -111 th Congresses. Lower-level staff ties represent non-senior/policy/constituency staff who previously worked for another member during that congress or one of the two previous congresses. Future staff ties represent senior staff who worked for another member in one of the next two congresses. Posterior standard deviations are in parentheses.
reflect both homophily and staff influence on member behavior, though further research is needed to disentangle their relative contributions. (We discuss our interpretation of these findings further in the conclusion.)
DISCUSSION
These findings provide the most rigorous evaluation of the effects of staff on legislator behavior to date. Leveraging movement between member offices in the U.S. Congress, we find that staff affect the legislative effectiveness of members of Congress. Representatives who employ senior staff that previously worked for other legislators tend to be more similar in their level of effectiveness than we would otherwise expect conditional on a series of key covariates, including being part of the leadership, holding a committee chairmanship, serving on high-profile committees, seniority, and majority party status. The results of falsification tests using lower-level staff as well as future senior staff ties suggest that these findings are not simply the result of homophily in the hiring process.
By contrast, our falsification test results for our Bayesian ideal points suggest that the similarities we observe in voting records among legislators linked by senior or policy staff are at least partly the result of homophily among members and staff who share similar views toward policy. In this sense, staff may help serve as "extensions" of members in the sense Kingdon described (1973) , helping them develop and maintain a voting record that is consistent with their views and beliefs.
The differences in the point estimates we observe between our primary results and the falsification tests suggest, however, that staff still play a role in shaping the voting patterns of legislators, who must cast an extensive number of votes on many issues on which they have little or no expertise and are forced to rely heavily on guidance from staff as well as other sources.
This research also contributes to the study of social networks in political science. By measuring ties between legislators formed by staff, we capture a new aspect of social networks in Congress.
The Bayesian heteroskedastic spatial autoregression models we estimate allow us to estimate the extent to which the behaviors of legislators who share staff ties resemble each other conditional on a series of observable measures. Finally, we develop a novel falsification test approach that helps us assess whether these relationships can be plausibly interpreted as causal or are mechanisms for or consequences of the behaviors of interest.
As with any study, however, our findings have limitations that future research should seek to address. First, though our data is more extensive than any previously considered in the literature, it does not allow us to test for long-term changes in the roles or effects of staff in Congress.
These relationships may differ, for instance, from those that obtained during the so-called "textbook Congress" of the mid-20th century (Shesple 1989) . Second, we focus only on the House of Representatives due to the larger number of legislators it contains and the difficulty of adequately accounting for differences between chambers in a pooled analysis. It would be worthwhile to consider the Senate in future research. Third, we are unable to study the effects of committee staff due to the difficulty of linking them to specific members or establishing their partisanship, but they are unquestionably important players in the legislative process and deserve further study. Fourth, as with any quantitative analysis, we rely on imperfect measures of our underlying behaviors of interest -in this case, legislative effectiveness and voting patterns. Fifth, we do not consider the relationship between our network of staff ties between members and other dyad-level variables such as cosponsorship (Fowler 2006a,b) , which would require a multiplex networks approach that is beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, it is of course not possible to eliminate all possible concerns about confounding. Future research should thus pursue other research designs that could also credible estimates of the effects of staff.
However, our findings still represent an important first step toward recognizing that Congressional staff may be more influential than legislative scholars have previously realized. Despite their low public profile, staff play a key role in the operations of Congress and the parties, especially in facilitating the flow of expertise and policy information among members.
ONLINE APPENDIX

Congressional staff responsibilities and coding
The Congressional Research Service describes the typical responsibilities of chiefs of staff in sweeping terms (Petersen 2010, 8,11): An incumbent in this position typically acts as the Member's chief policy advisor, and may also undertake political advising. An incumbent may also
• develop and implement all policy objectives, strategies, and operating plans for a Member's office;
• manage and direct all activities and staff of the Member's Washington, DC, and field offices;
• coordinate the activities of the Member with the leadership of the appropriate chamber and committees; and
• oversee the Member's office budget.
Policy staff (legislative aides, policy advisers, etc.) play a somewhat narrower, but still very influential, role in the legislative process, as the Congressional Management Foundation's description of the responsibilities of legislative assistants makes clear (2015):
• Formulates legislative initiatives for assigned issue areas which include:
-devising a legislative plan; -drafting the plan into legislative form; -planning, coordinating and scheduling introduction of legislation in the House (or offering it on an appropriate vehicle if it is in an amendment); -gathering support for a bill or amendment from other Members, as well as appropriate interest groups; -working with committees on legislation; -coordinating legislative support to get the bill passed in the House.
• Tracks legislation and other developments in his or her assigned issue areas and briefs the Member for floor work, committee work, work in the district, and outside House-related activities;
• Monitors legislative developments within committees;
• Plans and coordinates co-sponsorship and support of other legislation;
• Monitors legislation on the House floor, providing the Member with information on each vote;
• Writes Floor speeches for the Member
To identify senior and policy staff, we used the following procedure. Staffers identified as "chief of staff," "director" (e.g., "executive director," "staff director," "legislative director"), "administrative assistant," or variants of those titles (including deputies) were coded as senior staff based on position descriptions and titles from the Congressional Research Service (Petersen 2010) .
The list of specific keywords that we searched for in position titles, which was developed in conjunction with research assistants who reviewed the listed positions and compared the descriptions to the target terms, is as follows: Other staff whose titles described them as legislative aides, advisers, or fellows; included legal terms such as "attorney" or "counsel"; or listed issue areas for which they were responsible in a non-correspondence role were coded as policy staff following Drutman (2012 Although there is some heterogeneity in staff organization and responsibilities between offices, this approach has significant face validity and is consistent with prior research (Petersen 2010; Drutman 2012) . The full list of titles coded as senior and policy staff, which includes more than 12,000 variants due to idiosyncrasies in how staff titled are reported (e.g., "Admin Asst.," "Admin.
Assistant," "Admin. Assistant Banking Defense Labor," etc.), is available upon request.
Finally, the following terms were used to identify individuals whose primarily role was constituency service (this group was also excluded from our placebo tests):
worker; senior services -senior services director -service academies -service academy assistant -washington, d.c. did not match to staff (32%), suggesting a possible lack of cooperation with CQ.
The main text demonstrates that staff levels are stable at the member level over time. Here we consider variation in staff turnover over time. Very few senior/policy staff are reported as working for two or more offices during the same Congress in our data (just 1.6% of the 24,361 senior/policy staff-congress observations in our data) and temporal variation in these within-congress shifts is minimal (R 2 = 0.001 in a regression predicting within-congress turnover using Congress fixed effects; details available upon request). A significant portion of staff do exit Congress over time, however. Specifically, 50% of the senior/policy staff we observe in the 103 rd to 110 th Congresses were not observed in the subsequent Congress. However, these exit rates again vary only modestly over time, ranging from 46% after the 104 th to 56% after the 103 rd . Moreover, senior/policy staff who continue to serve in a subsequent congress are very likely to work for the same member if they do so -90% of those observed in the 103 rd to 110 th Congresses who served in the next congress worked for the same member -and these rates vary little over time (88-91% by congress). As a result, the rates at which senior/policy staff observed in a given congress work for the same member in the subsequent congress are relatively stable, ranging from 40% for the 103 rd Congress to 50% for 108 th .
Finally, as noted above, we observe no pattern of correlation between senior or policy/senior staff totals and our outcome variables at the member-Congress level. For total senior staff, the correlations for legislative effectiveness, the Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) ideal point estimate, and the absolute value of the ideal point estimate are -0.01, 0.06, and -0.04, respectively.
The corresponding values for total senior and policy staff are 0.02, -0.06, and 0.02.
Details on why committee staff data were excluded
We were unable to consider Congressional committee staff in this study for two reasons. First, only 7% of committee staff position titles in the CQ First Street data allow us to link a staff member to a specific committee member or to a chair or ranking member. Second, the position titles included frequently do not even allow us to distinguish between majority and minority staff. Only 38% of the 8,467 committee staff-Congress cases we observe can be linked to one of the two major parties or a legislator who is a member of or caucuses with a party. As a result, we are not confident that we can adequately estimate the effects of committee staff on legislator behavior, though we believe this is an important topic for future research. We therefore restrict our sample to personal staff. Our expectation is that excluding committee staff, who are key players in the legislative process, should make it harder for us to find staff effects.
Details on variables used in regressions
Bayesian ideal point estimates were generated using the pscl package in R version 3.2.1 and roll call data came from the Voteview website maintained by Keith Poole. Estimates were generated using the ideal function were all roll calls with fewer than 10 dissents wer dropped and legislators casting fewer than 200 roll calls were removed. We identified the model by constraining estimates for Dennis Kucinich (D) and Jeff Sessions (R) to the points −2 and 2 respectively (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004) . For each Congress, we ran the model separately for 500,000
iterations (thinning by 250) and discarded the first 250,000 iterations. In one case (Pennsylvania Republican Bud Shuster in the 107 th ) estimation failed due to a lack of variance in the roll call record (Shuster retired only a month into the Congress) and the estimate was removed.
Our seniority variable comes from the legislative effectiveness project (Volden and Wiseman 2014) , which itself relies on the Almanac of American Politics. Seniority is coded as the number of terms served in Congress (1=Freshman). Majority party, leadership status, female, African
American, and Latino also rely on the Almanac. The indicator for "power committees" was pro- 
Additional robustness checks
In addition to the results reported in the main text, we conducted numerous robustness checks.
The results for these models (spatial autoregressive coefficients only) are shown in Table A1 .
First, models 1 and 2 provide results including only policy staff. That is, we estimate the same models as in Tables 2 and 4 in the main text but exclude senior staff. While the results shown in Models 1 and 2 are essentially the same as those shown in the main text, we rely on the combined senior/policy staff in the main text because that specification is more consistent with our understanding of the legislative process. While we believe policy staff are important in shaping voting behavior, we do not view them as being exclusively effective as is implied by the policyonly formulation. (It would be odd to assume that legislative assistants can shape behavior while legislative directors cannot.) Tables 1-4 ; full results available upon request). House staff data from CQ First Street for the 105 th -111 th Congresses. Models 1 and 2 replicate the results in the main text using only policy staff. Models 3-6 replicate the results in the main text but define the edge weights between members i and j to be the total number of staff who worked for both members only during the current or previous congress. Models 7-10 show the results when no covariates are included, while models 11-14 show the results when committee fixed effects are added to the specification in the main text. In all cases, these alternative model specifications support the findings in the main text.
Second, in the main text we consider staff ties when a staffer is employed by two members within a single three-congress time horizon (the present congress or one of the previous two). Models 3-6 show how our results change if we instead consider a two-congress time horizon (the present or previous congress). The pooled spatial autocorrelation coefficients in the final column show that the results remain largely consistent with the main findings in the text. The only difference is that the 95% credible interval for Model (3) now includes zero (−0.0018, 0.1072), although a slightly less conservative 94% credible interval does not (0.0012, 0.1048).
Third, readers may be interested in the extent to which our results vary under various alternative model specifications. In Models 7-10, we therefore provide simple models that include no covariates while in Models 11-14 we add committee fixed effects.
1 When we do not control for possible confounders, all of the pooled estimates in Models 7-10 are reliably distinguishable from zero except for Model 9, where the 95% credible for the pooled estimate includes zero (−0.0012, 0.0848) but the slightly less conservative 94% credible interval excludes zero (0.004, 0.827). Similarly, adding 19 additional committee indicators in Models 11-14 does not substantively alter the pooled results discussed in the main text. In general, while ommitted variable bias is always possible, the substantive conclusions in the main text have proven to be robust to various model specifications.
